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Abstract
New episodic memories are retained better if learning is followed by a few minutes of wakeful rest than by the encoding of
novel external information. Novel encoding is said to interfere with the consolidation of recently acquired episodic
memories. Here we report four experiments in which we examined whether autobiographical thinking, i.e. an ‘internal’
memory activity, also interferes with episodic memory consolidation. Participants were presented with three wordlists
consisting of common nouns; one list was followed by wakeful rest, one by novel picture encoding and one by
autobiographical retrieval/future imagination, cued by concrete sounds. Both novel encoding and autobiographical
retrieval/future imagination lowered wordlist retention significantly. Follow-up experiments demonstrated that the
interference by our cued autobiographical retrieval/future imagination delay condition could not be accounted for by the
sound cues alone or by executive retrieval processes. Moreover, our results demonstrated evidence of a temporal gradient
of interference across experiments. Thus, we propose that rich autobiographical retrieval/future imagination hampers the
consolidation of recently acquired episodic memories and that such interference is particularly likely in the presence of
external concrete cues.
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Introduction
Quiet resting aids memory retention. People remember more
newly learned episodic information if they briefly rest immediately
after learning than if they attend to new external information
immediately after new learning [1–4]. This memory benefit, which
is not dependent on intentional rehearsal, is long-lasting,
remaining for at least 7 days [4]. Research indicates that wakeful
resting benefits episodic memory retention by enhancing memory
consolidation [3–6]. Neuroimaging work in rodents and humans
demonstrates that memory consolidation is associated with ‘offline
replay’ i.e. the reactivation of recently encoded memory traces
[5,7–9], the magnitude of which is correlated positively with
subsequent memory retention [5,8,9]. Importantly, offline replay
occurs predominantly during periods of sleep and wakeful rest
[5,8,9]. Sleep and wakeful rest might be especially conducive to
replay because of minimal encoding of incoming external
information, thereby protecting early (i.e. cellular) consolidation
from encoding-related interference [4,10].
In addition to encoding large amounts of external information,
humans engage in frequent ‘internally-generated’ activities such as
recalling their past and imagining their future, both of which are
associated with the episodic memory system [11–14]. Frequently,
memories of the past and imaginations about the future are
triggered by external cues in our environment, especially by
sensory impressions [15]. Marcel Proust [16] provides the most
famous example of externally cued retrieval, describing how the
taste of a madeleine cake dipped in a cup of tea led to an
overwhelming deluge of memories from his childhood (p53).
Like encoding of external information, autobiographical
retrieval and future imagination share some cognitive and neural
networks with memory consolidation [17–20]. In the study
reported here, we thus investigated whether these internal memory
activities also interfere with the consolidation of recently acquired
episodic memories.
We examined this question via four experiments in which the
learning of a list of common nouns was followed by one of three 9-
minute delay conditions and a subsequent surprise test of delayed
word recall. In Experiments 1 and 2 the delay conditions
comprised (i) wakeful resting, (ii) a picture search task (novel
external encoding) and (iii) a cued retrieval/future imagination
task. In Experiment 1 participants described aloud their experi-
ence in the picture search and cued retrieval/future imagination
tasks. In Experiment 2 participants gave no verbal descriptions of
these tasks, so as to tease apart the contribution of verbal
descriptions and the tasks per se to consolidation interference. In
Experiment 3 and 4 we explored the contributions of task
instructions and task cues to consolidation interference.
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Method
Ethics statement. This research was approved by the
University of Edinburgh’s Psychology Research Ethics Committee
(Ref: 217–1112). All participants provided their informed consent
in writing prior to taking part in our research. The person shown
in Figure 1 has given written informed consent (as outlined in
PLOS consent form) to publish his photo.
Participants. 36 healthy young adults (11 males, 25 females;
mean age=21.6 years, SD=1.40) participated in Experiment 1.
Procedure. We applied a within-subjects design with within-
subjects factor delay condition (wakeful resting vs. picture search
vs. cued retrieval/future imagination). The order of the three delay
conditions was counterbalanced across participants using 6
rotations (ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, CAB, CBA), meaning that
each delay condition occurred first, second and last in 12
participants.
The to-be-retained wordlists consisted of common nouns (e.g.
platform, daylight, whisky) and were matched for number of letters
and syllables, frequency, familiarity, concreteness and imagin-
ability (Kucera & Francis, 1967; British National Corpus
frequency measure). Moreover, all wordlists abided to the standard
phonotactic constraints of the written English language and were
matched in terms of phonological neighbourhood.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the Experiment included three word-
learning phases, which occurred one after the other. In each word-
learning phase a recorded wordlist was presented aurally with
instructions to remember as many words as possible for a
subsequent immediate recall test. Immediate recall was directly
followed by one of three 9-minute delay conditions, during which
participants either: (i) rested wakefully, (ii) performed a picture
search task or (iii) performed a cued retrieval/future imagination
task.
In the 9-minute wakeful resting delay condition participants were
asked to sit quietly in a dimly-lit testing room and relax whilst the
experimenter left the room to ‘‘set up the next section of the
experiment’’ [4].
In the 9-minute cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition,
participants were presented with ten familiar, short (3–5 second)
audible cues (e.g. a cat’s meow). The intervals between these cues
varied. Participants were asked to identify each cue silently and,
based on that cue, recall a past autobiographical memory or
imagine a future autobiographical scenario. They were free to
select between these, so as to replicate more closely the
unrestricted autobiographical thinking in everyday life. As in
previous autobiographical memory research [21–23] and future
imagination research [24,25], participants were requested to
describe aloud their memories/future imaginations in as much
vivid detail as possible while they recalled/imagined them. We
used single sound cues rather than verbal sentence cues to (i)
minimise verbal interference during the delay condition and (ii)
make for more naturalistic memory cueing. Participants were
asked to continue to describe their memories/future imaginations
until interrupted by a new cue, at which point they should
retrieve/imagine a new and distinctly different scenario.
In the 9-minute picture search delay condition participants were
presented with 10 new, familiar audible cues at the same varied
time intervals as in the cued retrieval/future imagination delay
condition. Participants were asked to identify each cue silently.
Two seconds post-cue, a detailed photo of a complex real-world
scene was presented on a computer screen. Participants were
Figure 1. Experimental procedure. There were three wordlist learning-phases. In each learning-phase participants learned one wordlist, followed
by immediate recall. Immediate recall was followed by a 9-minute delay condition, during which the critical manipulation occurred: participants
either (i) rested wakefully, (ii) retrieved autobiographical memories/imagined future scenarios in response to cue sounds, or (iii) engaged in a picture
search task (novel encoding). The order of the three delay conditions was counterbalanced across participants using 6 rotations (ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA,
CAB, CBA), meaning that each delay condition occurred first, second and last in 12 participants each. The figure shows the example order wakeful
resting R cued retrieval/future imagination R picture search. A surprise delayed-recall test for all three wordlists followed the final delay condition.
In Experiment 1 participants were required to give verbal descriptions during the picture search and cued retrieval/future imagination delay
conditions, whereas in Experiment 2 participants were asked to sit quietly whilst performing these delay conditions. Participants were then presented
with all twenty sound cues from the picture search and cued retrieval/imagination delay conditions. For each sound they were asked to recall in as
much detail as possible the associated picture, or the memory/future imagining that had been cued by each sound during the experiment.
Participants also completed a structured post-experimental questionnaire that included detailed, in-depth questions of what the participants had
done/thought about during each of the delay conditions, whether they had attempted to actively rehearse any material and whether they had
anticipated the delayed word recall test. The person shown in this Figure has given written informed consent (as outlined in PLOS consent form) to
publish his photo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093915.g001
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associated cue. Whilst performing this task they were asked to
provide a rich verbal account of the scene, describing what they
were searching for, where they were searching and any salient
features that stood out to them. Each photo contained a large
number of items related to the sound cue to ensure that
participants continued to search until interrupted by a new cue-
photo combination. We implemented audible cues and verbal
descriptions in this picture search task in order to keep constant as
many variables as possible across the picture search task (novel
encoding) and the cued retrieval/future imagination task, the
crucial difference being the internal vs. external nature of these
tasks.
Upon completion of all three word-learning phases, i.e.
,27 minutes after learning of wordlist 1, ,18 minutes after
learning of wordlist 2 and ,9 minutes after learning wordlist 3,
participants underwent a surprise delayed recall test in which they
were asked to freely recall as many words as possible from all three
presented wordlists (total of 45 words), in any order. We probed
recall for all three wordlists together to ensure that recall would
come as a surprise for all delay conditions, thus reducing the
likelihood of conscious rehearsal of words during the latter delay
conditions [4]. Participants were then presented with all twenty
sound cues from the picture search and cued retrieval/imagination
delay conditions. For each sound they were asked to recall in as
much detail as possible the associated picture, or the memory/
future imagining that had been cued by each sound during the
experiment.
Participants also completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery
Questionnaire (VVIQ) [26] and a structured post-experimental
questionnaire. The latter included detailed in-depth questions of
what the participants had done/thought about during each of the
delay conditions, whether they had attempted to actively rehearse
any material and whether they had anticipated the delayed word
recall test [4].
Scoring. For each delay condition we computed the number
of words recalled correctly at immediate recall (/15) and delayed
recall (/15). In order to examine how much of the immediately
recalled material was retained in each of the three delay
conditions, we computed percentage retention scores for each
delay condition ((delayed recall/immediate recall) 6100).
We used Levine et al.’s [23] method to score the descriptions of
the past and future. Descriptions were segmented into internal
(episodic) and external (semantic) details. Internal details were
further categorised as ‘Event’, ‘Time’, ‘Place’, ‘Perceptual’ or
‘Thoughts/emotion’. External details were further categorised as
‘Event’, ‘Semantic’, ‘Repetition’ or ‘Other’. The number of details
in each category was counted to derive a quantitative (i) internal
score, (ii) external score, and (iii) total score (internal + external) of
the richness of each description. We also derived a qualitative
score of the richness of each description by rating each ‘internal’
category on a scale from 0–3 and adding this to the ‘episodic
richness’ score (0–6), resulting in a qualitative ‘episodic re-
experiencing’ score (maximum=18) [23]. We scored the descrip-
tions of the pictures by counting the number of key observations.
Results
Immediate word recall. There was no difference between
the delay conditions in immediate recall performance
(F(2,70)=0.054, p=.948, gr
2=.002), indicating that baseline
memory performance was matched across the three delay
conditions.
Wordlist retention. Mean percentage retention scores ((de-
layed recall/immediate recall) 6100) are displayed in Figure 2. A
main effect of delay condition was observed (F(2,70)=11.875, p,
.001, gr
2=.253). Planned t tests showed that wordlist retention
was significantly higher when learning was followed by wakeful
rest than by the picture search (t(35)=4.351, p,.001) or cued
retrieval/future imagination (t(35)=3.908, p,.005) delay condi-
tions. Retention did not differ significantly between the picture
search and cued retrieval/future imagination delay conditions
(t(35)=2.653, p=.518).
Expected recall and rehearsal. Three participants expect-
ed the delayed recall and thought about wordlist material during
some of the rest delay. However, none of the results changed when
removing these participants from the analyses.
Delay condition activity and wordlist retention. The
majority of participants (N=33) reported mind-wandering during
the wakeful rest delay condition, incidentally recalling the past and
thinking about the future. In the cued retrieval/future imagination
delay condition 14 participants predominantly recalled autobio-
graphical memories while the remaining 22 participants predom-
inantly imagined future scenarios. Wordlist retention did not differ
significantly between these retrospectively formed ‘memory recall’
and ‘future imagination’ groups (F(1,34)=0.035, p=.854,
gr
2=.001).
In the picture search delay condition there were no significant
correlations between the level of retention of the associated
wordlist and the number of picture details described, neither for
the online descriptions given during the 9-minute delay period
itself (R
2=.008, p=.602), nor for the post-experimental recall of
the pictures (R
2=.003, p=.754).
In the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition there
were no significant correlations between the level of retention of
the associated wordlist and the quantitative internal score for the
online descriptions given during the 9-minute delay period itself
(R
2=.003, p=.732), nor for the post-experimental recall of these
cued memories/imaginations (R
2=.002, p=.784). This was also
true for the quantitative total (internal + external) score for online
descriptions during the delay period itself (R
2=.015, p=.472), and
for post-experimental recall of cued memories/imaginations
(R
2=.000, p=.960).
However, in the cued retrieval/future imagination condition,
there was a significant negative correlation between the level of
retention of the associated wordlist and the mean qualitative score
of episodic richness of the online descriptions given during the 9-
minute delay period itself (R
2=.214, p,.005). There was no
significant correlation between the level of wordlist retention and
the mean qualitative score of episodic richness of the post-
experimental recall of the memories/imaginations that had been cued
during the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition
(R
2=.057, p=.161). Moreover, there were no other significant
correlations between wordlist retention and qualitative Levine sub-
scores for descriptions given during the cued retrieval/imagination
delay, or during post-experimental recall (all p..223).
The number of details described in the picture search delay
condition correlated significantly and positively with the quanti-
tative internal score in the cued retrieval/future imagination delay
condition, both during the delay itself (R
2=.324, p,.001) and
during the post-experimental recall of the pictures/memories/
imaginations (R
2=.344, p,.001).
Given the counterbalanced nature of the paradigm, the length
of the delay interval between the cued retrieval/future imagination
condition and delayed word recall/post-experimental recall of
previously cued memories/imaginations was not equal across
participants (,27-18 minutes, N=12; ,18-9 minutes, N=12;
Autobiographical Thinking Interferes with Consolidation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 April 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 4 | e93915,9-1 minutes, N=12). However, neither wordlist retention nor
post-experimental recall of cued memories/imaginations was
affected significantly by these variations in the length of the delay
condition – delayed recall test interval. This finding indicates that
the above correlations between wordlist retention and descriptions
of cued memory/future imagination were not confounded by
variations in the length of the interval between the delay condition
and delayed recall. The same was true for the picture search delay
condition.
Comments. Experiment 1 confirms that people retain less
newly learned episodic material when the learning period is
followed immediately by new external information than when the
learning period is followed immediately by wakeful resting [1–
4,27]. Importantly, our cued retrieval/future imagination delay
condition had an equally detrimental effect on the retention of
newly learned episodic material.
The ‘describe aloud’ procedure was chosen as it allowed us to (i)
ascertain that participants were performing the cued retrieval/
future imagination task, and (ii) quantify their task performance.
However, there is the possibility that the verbal description, rather
than the cued retrieval/imagination, caused the observed inter-
ference effect in the cued retrieval/future imagination delay
condition, e.g. due to the need for semantic retrieval and speech
production, and/or due to the encoding of articulated, narrated
descriptions into episodic memory. The question of whether or not
the verbal descriptions produced the interference observed is not
only of theoretical interest; it is also of interest to the
generalizability of these findings to everyday life, wherein people
frequently think about the past and future in silence, without the
need for rich, verbal descriptions. If the interference observed in
the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition was
produced by verbal description, the interference effect should
vanish in the absence of a verbal description task. This was the
focus of Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we examined whether the cued memory
recall/future imagination task lowers retention of newly learned
words, even when no verbal descriptions are required.
Method
Participants. 36 new healthy young adults (10 males, 26
females; mean age=20.2 years, SD=1.99) participated in
Experiment 2.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that for
Experiment 1 except that participants were asked to perform the
cued retrieval/imagination and picture search tasks in silence
rather than provide a verbal description.
Results
Immediate word recall. There was no difference between
the delay conditions in immediate recall performance
(F(2,70)=0.042, p=.959, gr
2=.001), indicating that baseline
memory performance was matched across the three delay
conditions.
Wordlist retention. Mean percentage retention scores ((de-
layed recall/immediate recall) 6100) are displayed in Figure 2. A
main effect of delay condition was observed (F(2,70)=16.967, p,
.001, gr
2=.500). Planned t tests showed that wordlist retention
was significantly higher when learning was followed by wakeful
rest than by the picture search (t(35)=2.902, p,.05) or cued
retrieval/future imagination (t(35)=5.673, p,.001) delay condi-
tions. Retention was also significantly higher when word learning
was followed by the picture search delay condition than when
word learning was followed by the cued retrieval/future imagina-
tion delay condition (t(35)=22.235, p,.05).
Expected recall and rehearsal. Two participants expected
the delayed recall and thought about wordlist material during
some of the rest delay. However, none of the results changed when
removing these participants from the analyses.
Delay condition activity and wordlist retention. The
majority of participants (N=34) reported mind-wandering during
Figure 2. Mean percentage-retention scores as a function of delay condition (wakeful resting vs. picture search vs. cued retrieval/
future imagination) in Experiment 1 (where participants provided verbal descriptions during the picture search and cued retrieval/
future imagination delay conditions) and Experiment 2 (where participants sat quietly during all delay conditions). Percentage-
retention scores were calculated by dividing the number of words recalled correctly in the delayed recall test by the number of words recalled
correctly at immediate recall and multiplying by 100. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093915.g002
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thinking about the future. In the cued retrieval/imagination delay
condition, 17 participants predominantly recalled autobiograph-
ical memories while the remaining 19 participants predominantly
imagined future scenarios. Wordlist retention did not differ
significantly between these retrospectively formed ‘memory recall’
and ‘future imagination’ groups (F(1,34)=0.103, p=.750,
gr
2=.003). There were no significant correlations between the
level of wordlist retention and the level of post-experimental cued
recall of the scenarios, neither in the picture search delay condition
nor in the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition.
Experiment 1 Versus Experiment 2
Wordlist retention. Planned t tests showed that retention did
not differ significantly between Experiment 1 and 2 in the wakeful
resting delay condition (t(70)=20.663, p=.510), the picture
search delay condition (t(70)=21.555, p=.125) or crucially, the
cued retrieval/imagination delay condition (t(70)=0.474,
p=.637). Moreover, there were no significant interactions between
Experiment and delay condition when contrasting retention in the
wakeful rest delay condition with retention (i) in the picture search
delay condition (F(1, 70)=.409, p=.524, gr
2=.006) or (ii) in the
cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition (F(1, 70)=.788,
p=0.378, gr
2=.011).
Post-experimental recall of sound-related pictures and
cued memories/imaginings. There were no significant dif-
ferences between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 in the post-
experimental recall of (i) the number of internal details
(t(70)=1.310, p=.194), (ii) the total number of (internal + external)
details (t(70)=1.519, p=.133), (iii) the qualitative episodic richness
score of previously cued memories/imaginings (t(70)=21.599,
p=.124), or (iv) sound-related pictures (t(70)=1.749, p=.085).
This finding suggests that the level of retrieval/imagination and
picture viewing during the delay itself was similar in the two
experiments, despite the variations in instructions.
Comments. Our picture search delay condition, and crucial-
ly our cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition interfered
with the retention of new episodic memories, irrespective of
whether or not people had to verbally describe their memories/
imaginations during the delay. This finding rules out a major
involvement of verbal description in the interference effect
observed in the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition
of Experiment 1, and instead suggests that it was cued retrieval/
future imagination per se that interfered with wordlist memory.
However, given the presence of sounds in the cued retrieval/future
imagination delay, we cannot rule out the possibility that the mere
anticipation and/or encoding of these sounds were responsible for
the observed interference effect in Experiments 1 and 2. We
sought to exclude this possibility via Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we investigated whether the mere anticipation
and/or encoding of our sound stimuli interferes with wordlist
retention.
Method
Participants. 36 new healthy young adults (19 males, 17
females; mean age=20.97 years, SD=2.32) participated in
Experiment 3.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that for
Experiment 2 except that the cued retrieval/future imagination
delay condition was now replaced by a ‘sounds only’ delay
condition. In this delay condition we presented the familiar sounds
from the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition of
Experiments 1 and 2. However, in contrast to Experiments 1 and
2, participants in Experiment 3 were informed that they should sit
and relax and that several sounds would be presented at varied
time intervals to minimise the risk of them falling asleep. They
were told that they would not be required to perform any task
during this period. We also added a question to the post-
experimental questionnaire to verify whether the sounds had
spontaneously triggered memories/imaginations in any partici-
pants.
Results
Immediate word recall. There was no difference between
the delay conditions in immediate recall performance
(F(2,70)=0.210, p=.811, gr
2=.006), indicating that baseline
memory performance was matched across the three delay
conditions.
Wordlist retention. Mean percentage retention scores ((de-
layed recall/immediate recall) 6100) are displayed in Figure 3. A
main effect of delay condition was observed (F(2,70)=7.156, p,
.001, gr
2=.170). Planned t tests showed that wordlist retention
was significantly higher when learning was followed by wakeful
rest than by the picture search (t(35)=4.055, p,.01) or ‘sounds
only’ (t(35)=2.839, p,.001) delay conditions.
Expected recall and rehearsal. Two participants expected
the delayed recall and thought about wordlist material during
some of the rest delay. However, none of the results changed when
removing these participants from the analyses.
Delay condition activities. The majority of participants
(N=33) reported mind-wandering during the wakeful rest delay
condition, incidentally recalling the past and thinking about the
future. When probed after the experiment, 26 participants
reported sound-related memories/future imaginations during the
‘sounds only’ delay condition. The remaining 10 participants
reported mind-wandering during the ‘sounds only’ delay condi-
tion.
Experiments 1–3
Wordlist retention. Planned t tests showed that wordlist
retention did not differ significantly between Experiment 29s cued
retrieval/future imagination delay condition and Experiment 39s
‘sound only’ delay condition (t(70)=2.287, p=.775). In addition,
no significant difference was observed in wordlist retention
between the picture search delay condition of Experiments 2
and 3 (t(70)=1.441, p=.154), or Experiments 1 and 3 (t(70)=2
0.047, p=.963).
Comments. In contrast to our predictions, the ‘sounds only’
delay condition produced significant levels of interference with
episodic memory. At a first glance, this finding suggests that the
anticipation/encoding of sounds might have in fact produced the
interference observed in the cued retrieval/future imagination
delay condition in Experiments 1 and 2, and in the ‘sounds only’
condition in Experiment 3. However, to our surprise, the
presented sounds spontaneously triggered memories/imaginations
in most participants. This unexpected observation actually fits the
finding that external concrete cues, especially sounds, frequently
trigger ‘involuntary’ memories [15]. It thus appears likely that this
(involuntary) retrieval/future imagination accounted for the
interference effect observed in our ‘sounds only’ condition.
However, given the presence of sounds and (unanticipated) cued
retrieval/future imagination in the ‘sounds only’ delay condition,
we still cannot rule out the possibility that the mere anticipation
and/or encoding of sounds was responsible for the observed
Autobiographical Thinking Interferes with Consolidation
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possibility in Experiment 4.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4 we investigated the specific effect of sound
anticipation/encoding on episodic memory retention. We did so
by utilising meaningless sounds so as to minimise the cueing of
involuntary memories/future imaginations that was observed via
familiar, concrete sounds in Experiment 3.
Method
Participants. 36 new healthy young adults (10 males, 26
females; mean age=20.4 years, SD=1.78) participated in
Experiment 4.
Procedure. As in Experiment 3 we included the wakeful
resting delay condition and the ‘sounds only’ delay condition.
However, we replaced the picture search delay condition with a
new ‘bangs only’ delay condition. Here participants were
presented with 10 different meaningless ‘‘bang’’ sounds at the
same varied time intervals as used across Experiment 1–3. We also
added a question to the post-experimental questionnaire to verify
whether the ‘‘bang’’ sounds had spontaneously triggered memo-
ries/imaginations in any participants.
Results
Immediate word recall. There was no difference between
the delay conditions in immediate recall performance
(F(2,70)=0.676, p=.512, gr
2=.019) indicating that baseline
memory performance was matched across the three delay
conditions.
Wordlist retention. Mean percentage retention scores ((de-
layed recall/immediate recall) 6100) are displayed in Figure 3. A
main effect of delay condition was observed (F(2,70)=3.317, p,
.05, gr
2 =.087). Planned t tests showed that wordlist retention
was significantly higher when learning was followed by wakeful
rest than by the ‘sounds only’ delay condition (t(35)=2.545, p,
.05). There was no significant difference in retention between the
wakeful resting delay condition and the ‘bangs only’ delay
condition (t(35)=.760, p=.452). However, retention was higher
when learning was followed by the ‘bangs only’ delay than by the
‘sounds only’ delay condition, and this difference was near-
significant (t(35)=21.755, p=.088).
Expected recall and rehearsal. Three participants expect-
ed the delayed recall and thought about wordlist material during
some of the rest delay. However, none of the results changed when
removing these participants from the analyses.
Delay condition activities. The majority of participants
(N=33) reported mind-wandering during the wakeful rest delay
condition, incidentally recalling the past and thinking about the
future. When probed after the experiment, 25 participants
reported sound-related retrieval of memories/future imaginations
during the ‘sounds only’ delay condition. The remaining 11
participants reported mind-wandering. No participants reported
sound-related retrieval of memories/future imaginations during
the ‘bangs only’ delay condition.
Comments. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that the
memory interference observed during cued retrieval/imagination
in Experiments 1–3 was not simply the product of sound
anticipation/encoding.
Experiment 1–4
Effect of wordlist position and position of the wakeful rest
delay condition. Given that retention of the three wordlists was
probed within a single test of delayed recall, the delay intervals
between learning and delayed recall varied between wordlist 1
(,27 minutes), wordlist 2 (,18 minutes) and wordlist 3 (,9 min-
utes). We therefore examined whether delay interval length
affected retention in our experiments. Across Experiments 1–4
there was no main effect of delay interval length (F(2,280)=1.707,
p=.182, gr
2=.012), Experiment (F(3,140)=0.936, p=.425,
gr
2=.020), or interaction between delay interval length and
Experiment (F(6,280)=1.477, p=.186, gr
2 =.031).
In order to ascertain that consolidation, rather than a passive
minimal interference effect, was at play in the memory boost via
wakeful rest in our paradigm, we examined whether (i) the
beneficial effect of wakeful rest was observed independently of the
Figure 3. Mean percentage-retention scores as a function of delay condition in Experiment 3 (wakeful resting vs. picture search vs.
‘sounds only’) and in Experiment 4 (wakeful resting vs. ‘bangs only’ vs. ‘sounds only’). All three delay conditions were performed in
silence. Participants were not instructed to retrieve memories/imagine future scenarios in any of the delay conditions. Percentage-retention scores
were calculated by dividing the number of words recalled correctly in the delayed recall test by the number of words recalled correctly at immediate
recall and multiplying by 100. Error bars show the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0093915.g003
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(ii) whether there was a temporal gradient of interference
[2,3,6,10] across Experiments 1–3. Addressing (i), the degree of
benefit from wakeful rest did not differ between the participants
who received the wakeful rest delay first, second or third (i.e. no
significant interaction between delay condition and position of the
wakeful rest delay, F(4,210)=0.399, p=.809, gr
2=.011). In fact,
wordlist material learned immediately prior to the wakeful rest
delay was retained equally well in participants who received the
wakeful rest delay first (68.25%), second (61.10%) or third
(66.43%) (i.e. no significant effect of position of the wakeful rest
delay, F(2,105)=0.846, p=.432, gr
2=.016). Addressing (ii),
wordlist 1 was retained significantly better after the Experiment
(after ,27 minutes) when wordlist 1 learning was followed
immediately by the 9-minute wakeful rest delay condition
(68.22%), thus delaying the onset of the task-filled delay
conditions, than when wordlist 1 learning was followed immedi-
ately by a 9-minute task-filled delay (41.83%) (t(70)=4.646 p,
.001). There was no significant difference in wordlist 1 retention
when wakeful resting occurred after a 9-minute (41.83%) or after
an 18-minute (48.75%) task-filled delay (t(70)=21.151, p=.254).
In order to ensure that these effects were not confounded by the
position of the wordlist within the experiment, we repeated the
same analyses for wordlist 2. The effect of position of wakeful rest
was identical: wordlist 2 was retained significantly better after the
Experiment (,18 minutes) when wordlist 2 learning was followed
immediately by the 9-minute wakeful rest delay condition
(65.66%) than when wordlist 2 learning was followed immediately
by a 9-minute task-filled delay (42.25%) (t(70)=4.556, p,.001).
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that, like external information, cued
autobiographical memory retrieval and cued imagination of the
future interfere with the retention of recently-acquired episodic
memories. Across all experiments, participants retained more
wordlist material when wordlist learning was followed immediately
by wakeful resting than when wordlist learning was followed
immediately by retrieval of past memories/imagination of future
scenarios, cued by familiar sounds. As with previous research [4]
only a few participants in each of our experiments thought about
the wordlist material during the rest delay. When these
participants were removed from our analyses no differences in
results were observed. Thus, it is unlikely that the interference
effect in the picture search and cued retrieval/future imagination
delays can be accounted for merely by reduced intentional
rehearsal/thinking of wordlist material.
It is also unlikely that this interference effect can be accounted
for by the mere displacing of recently acquired transient memory
traces by subsequent information. This hypothesis of a ‘passive’
effect of wakeful rest posits that the benefit of wakeful rest lasts
only until people are exposed to interfering material [2,10,28].
The findings of (i) a lasting beneficial effect of wakeful rest after
exposure to further material [4] and (ii) a temporal gradient of
interference are not in keeping with this interference hypothesis.
This lasting beneficial effect of wakeful rest and the temporal
gradient of interference can however be accounted for straight-
forwardly by memory consolidation. Memory consolidation is
defined as the process by which new memories strengthen over
time, becoming less susceptible to interference [6,29]. We thus
hypothesise that the interference effect observed in our picture
search task and in our cued retrieval/future imagination task was
the result of interference with automatic memory consolidation
processes [4]. We will return to this hypothesis later in the
discussion.
What interfered with consolidation in our cued retrieval/future
imagination task? Experiments 1 and 2 showed that the
interference could not be accounted for merely by the aloud
verbal descriptions provided in Experiment 1: the interference
effect in the picture search and cued retrieval/future imagination
delay conditions occurred irrespective of whether or not partic-
ipants had to provide verbal descriptions of the scenarios. In
Experiment 2, wordlist retention was in fact higher in the picture
search delay condition when undertaken in silence than when
accompanied by verbal descriptions (see Figure 2). However, this
difference was not statistically significant, and likely the product of
some high performing participants in Experiment 2. Indeed, no
such increase in retention was observed in the picture search delay
condition in Experiment 3, in which picture search was also
undertaken in silence (see Figures 2 and 3). More importantly, in
the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition, wordlist
retention did not differ between the participants who undertook
the task in silence (Experiment 2) and those who were tasked with
providing verbal descriptions of their memories/imaginings
(Experiment 1). We acknowledge that some participants in
Experiment 2 (and in the ‘sounds only’ delay condition of
Experiments 3 and 4) may have spontaneously narrated their
memories/imaginations via inner speech, and that this inner
speech could have produced some specific verbal interference.
However, it is unlikely that such inner speech could have been at
the heart of the interference observed in the cued retrieval/future
imagination delay condition. If mere verbalization of memories/
imaginings had contributed substantially to the interference effects
observed in the cued retrieval/future imagination delay condition,
then one would have expected there to be a negative correlation
between (i) the total number of (internal + external) details uttered
during the delay itself and (ii) the level of wordlist retention.
However, this was not the case (R
2=.015, p=.472; Experiment 1).
This finding suggests that the interference observed across our
Experiments was produced by the cued retrieval/future imagina-
tion task itself rather than by potential concurrent verbalisation of
what was being retrieved/imagined.
In Experiments 1 and 2 participants were instructed to retrieve
autobiographical memories/imagine future scenarios relating to
the sounds played. This will have resulted in strategic search and
related executive processes [30]. It is unlikely however that such
executive processes caused the memory interference observed. In
Experiment 3 and 4 the majority of participants reported
spontaneous sound-related memories/future imaginings even
though they had not been given any instructions to use the sounds
as cues (‘sounds only’ condition). Research shows that ‘involun-
tary’ memories, such as the ones observed in Experiment 3 and 4,
require very little executive processing [30]. In fact, external sound
cues can even reactivate memories during sleep [31]. Aside from
executive processes, voluntary and involuntary memories are said
to have a common cognitive basis [30]. The fact that voluntary
and involuntary memories/imaginings interfered to the same
extent suggests that the interference was produced either by the
sounds or by the automatic processing of autobiographical
memory traces/imagined scenarios, rather than by executive
retrieval mechanisms.
The findings in Experiment 4 suggest strongly that the mere
anticipation/encoding of sounds cannot account for the interfer-
ence observed in our cued retrieval/future imagination condition.
When external sound cues were not concrete (‘bangs only’ delay
condition), subsequent wordlist retention was equivalent to that
seen following wakeful resting. This suggests strongly that some
Autobiographical Thinking Interferes with Consolidation
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sound presentation in order for interference to occur. Indeed,
whereas all participants mind wandered in the ‘bangs only’ delay
condition (Experiment 4), the majority of participants reported
recalling sound-related memories/future imaginations in the
‘sounds only’ delay conditions (Experiment 3 and 4). It could be
argued that the observed interference via familiar sound cues was
simply associated with covert or overt identification of these
sounds, rather than with the processing of memories/imagination
of future scenarios. If so, the richness of retrieved memories/future
imaginations should not have affected wordlist retention.
However, Experiment 1 revealed that wordlist retention
decreased significantly as a function of increasing (qualitative)
episodic richness of autobiographical memories/future imaginings.
This finding suggests strongly that it was the processing of
autobiographical memories/future scenarios that interfered with
wordlist retention. Moreover, wordlist retention was not associated
with the number of semantic details described, suggesting that
interference was particular to the episodic nature of autobio-
graphical retrieval/future imagination.
As indicated in the introduction, the encoding of novel external
information is hypothesised to interfere with the automatic offline
replay/early (i.e. cellular) consolidation of recently acquired
memory traces [4,10]. Our finding of a temporal gradient of
interference bolster this hypothesis and suggest that autobiograph-
ical retrieval and future imagining also interfere with early (i.e.
cellular) memory consolidation. Like the encoding of external
information, the retrieval of autobiographical memories/imagina-
tion of future scenarios shares some cognitive and neural networks
with consolidation [12,16,18,20,32–34]. This cognitive and neural
overlap could be at the heart of the memory consolidation
interference observed. However, given that encoding is typically
accompanied by retrieval, and retrieval is typically accompanied
by encoding, it is difficult to disentangle the contributions of these
two episodic memory processes to the interference observed here.
There is the possibility that our autobiographical retrieval/future
imagination task interfered with wordlist consolidation due to the
reactivation of memory traces associated with the autobiographical
memories/imagined future scenarios. However, it is also possible
that our autobiographical retrieval/future imagination task
interfered with wordlist consolidation due to the subsequent
encoding of these autobiographical memories/imagined future
scenarios. Indeed, at least some encoding must have taken place
in order for participants to remember their memories/imaginings
after the experiment. This said there was a stronger association
between wordlist retention and (qualitative) episodic richness of
memories/imaginations during the delay condition itself than after
the experiment. This finding could hint tentatively that the
memory interference was produced primarily by the reactivation/
reconstruction of past autobiographical memory traces rather than
by subsequent encoding of those autobiographical memory traces.
However, more extensive work is required to dissociate the specific
contributions of encoding and retrieval to consolidation interfer-
ence.
Irrespective of the specific processes that are responsible for this
consolidation interference, the correlational analyses could suggest
that memory interference via cued retrieval/future imagination is
not associated strongly with the quantity of retrieved/imagined
information. However, the number of described details might not
necessarily reflect the ‘true’ richness of a person’s memory/
imagined scenario. Some people might simply provide less detailed
descriptions than others, irrespective of the richness of their
memories/imagined scenarios [25]. Evidence for this hypothesis
comes from the finding of individual differences in the number of
details described in the picture search task, in which images were
of equal perceptual richness across participants. Moreover, there
was a strong correspondence in Experiment 1 between the number
of details described in (i) the picture search task, and (ii) the cued
retrieval/future imagination task. Therefore, the stronger corre-
lation between wordlist retention and (qualitative) episodic
richness than between wordlist retention and number of details
described might simply reflect differences in sensitivity to true
richness of memory/imagination.
It is of interest that across Experiments 1–4, the majority of
participants reported mind wandering during wakeful resting [4],
incidentally recalling the past and thinking about the future. It is
unclear why participants retained more wordlist material following
this retrieval/future imagination during mind wandering than
following externally cued retrieval/future imagination. One
possibility is that these conditions differed qualitatively in that
different cognitive processes might have been active during
externally and internally cued autobiographical retrieval/future
imagining [35,36]. Alternatively, it is possible that these conditions
differed quantitatively. Participants might have retrieved more
memories/imagined more scenarios when external concrete cues
were present than when they were absent, resulting in more
interference during the former condition. Indeed, research
suggests that involuntary autobiographical memories are more
frequently triggered by external cues than by internal cues
(thoughts and emotions) [30].
It is also possible that autobiographical memories/imaginings
were more complex and episodically-rich when cued externally
than internally, thus interfering more with the consolidation of
wordlist material. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from the
finding that participants whose externally cued autobiographical
memories/imaginings were episodically sparse retained more
wordlist material than those participants whose externally cued
autobiographical memories/imaginings were episodically rich. In
the same vein, a participant resting quietly would likely show
lowered wordlist retention if internal cues triggered particularly
rich autobiographical memories/imaginings immediately after the
word learning period. Indeed, this might explain individual
differences in the degree of benefit gained from wakeful resting
after new learning. Further work should probe in detail what
participants thought about during the wakeful rest delay, so as to
allow for correlations between the richness of autobiographical
thinking and wordlist retention during wakeful rest.
In addition to encoding large amounts of new external
information, humans spend a lot of time recollecting their past
and thinking about their future, often triggered by external cues.
Our study shows that these activities hamper the consolidation of
recently acquired episodic memories. Therefore, if one wishes to
retain newly acquired information well, it is advantageous to rest
for a few minutes after learning, avoiding external information and
cues as well as complex reminiscing about one’s past and future.
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